Under this section when an abettor abets an act with the intention of causing a particular effect, and an act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the abetment cause a different effect from that which the abettor intended, the abettor is liable for the effect caused in the same manner and to the same extent as if the abettor had abetted the act with the intention of causing that particular effect which in act had resulted, provided the abettor had the knowledge that the act which he abetted initially was likely to cause that effect which in fact resulted ultimately.
The illustration under this section illustrates the point very well when it says that A instigates Â to cause grievous hurt to Z. Â in consequence of the instigation, causes grievous hurt to Z. Z dies in consequence. Here if A knew that the grievous hurt abetted was likely to cause death, A is liable to be punished with the punishment provided for murder. While in section 111 one act is abetted but a different act is done, in this section the same act which is abetted is done but it results into a different effect than that intended by the abettor.